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INTRODUCTION
Much of the writing on the South African motor industry assumes that the coming of
the multinational automobile company brought with it the transplantation of the
repertoire of production techniques developed under the rubric of Fordism. Whether
inspired by Taylonst assumptions about scientific management or Braverman-inspired
criticisms of the degradation of work, there is general agreement in the literature on
the generally low levels of skill, high levels of monotony, and general dehumanisation
associated with work in the auto plants. While most analysts pay close attention to
the low-volume character of the local industry when discussing the crisis of high-cost
production in a saturated market, no one has investigated the obvious point that low-
volumes should have a dramatic impact on the nature of work itself.
This paper departs from the conventional view of the labour process in the motor
industry, and argues that analysis until now has failed to come to grips with the
complexity of work in the industry. Indeed, rather than viewing the industry as one
dominated by deskilling and dehumanisation driven by rapid mechanisation, the
perspective developed here is that jobs require far greater thought and direct physical
control over execution than is allowed for in the Fordist model. Workers not only
perform more complicated tasks than similar workers in the United States and
Europe, but are invariably able to perform a very wide range of jobs as well.
Workers are not reduced to mere appendages of machines controlled ultimately by
supervision or production engineers in time and motion departments. Rather, an
elaborate system has developed in South African automobile plants where workers
develop a wide range of skills, which may be described as "aUrounder" status. Instead
of seeing workers as possessing few or no skills, this paper makes use of the concept
"tacit skills" to argue that automobile workers possess a wide array of carefully
developed abilities.
Workers' problems in the industry grow less out of the conventional grievances
identified in the Fordist approach - monotony and degradation - than out of a deeply
felt injustice at the heart of the system of job grading, reward, and promotion. The
formal job grading system bears Little similarity to the actual tasks workers perform,
failing in the main to recognise their tacit skills and aUrounder status. Nor is there
any comfortable fit between jobs and level of education. Thus, while workers'
knowledge on the job - their skills - are crucial ingredients in the company's success,
workers themselves remain largely unrecognised and generally unrewarded for then-
contribution. As a result, workers develop a sense of deep frustration in their
working lives, leading to profound demotivation, with little sense of a future. These
attitudes are important products of the labour process, and have extremely serious
implications for productivity in the industry.
The technical division of labour is not the source of these problems; rather they grow
out of an informal personalistic system of control dominated by white foremen, which
has two distinct tap roots. Supervisorial domination was the mode of control in the
factories from their inception in the 1920s through to the 1960s when trade unions
and industrial relations departments usurped many of thfe functions of foremen.
Supervisors' continuing control over promotion is a legacy of this system, though in a
covert form adapted to the modern system of labour relations. The second root lies
in the historical practices of job reservation in which whites protected their own
positions while controlling the pace and form of entry of blacks into the factory
through manipulation of definitions of skill and job categories.
Supervisors' informal practices around promotion make use of the dominant modes of
these two historical traditions: first, the importance of personalistic ties of patronage
to particular foreman, and second, a deep-seated racism which privileges whites.
Thus, despite the transfer to the industrial relations system (labour relations, trade
unions, and the Industrial Council) of powers of hiring and firing, wage increases, and
discipline, in actual practice, foremen maintain great, though hidden powers which
allow them to subvert the formal promotion system seemingly monopolized by labour
relations.
By admitting the existence of tacit skills amongst automobile workers, this paper
hopes to lay bare an extremely important area of conflict in the factories. At the
same time, however, it also aims to expose an extremely valuable asset workers
possess. Their depth of skills has afforded management with a very rare flexibility in
deploying manpower, a priceless ability to rotate workers as the volume of work or
absenteeism demands. Such capacity - virtually unremarked in the literature - is one
which has been very carefully cultivated by automobile companies in Japan, one
universally viewed as central to their success in cutting production costs.1 Japanese
producers have similarly viewed workers8 job knowledge as a resource to be cultivated
in the quest for improved productivity; indeed, managements bestow upon such
workers higher status, better wages, and greater job security. The view that South
African automobile workers are essentially cheap, relatively unskilled labour denies
them their dignity and obliterates abilities they have struggled to develop. But, more
importantly, the view also ignores a crucial factor which makes production possible at
all. If developed and rewarded, workers tacit skills could play an extremely important
role in efforts to improve productivity in the industry.
Thus far, however, these grievances associated with skills and promotion have not
resulted in worker action. In most cases the informal system is taken as an inevitable
fact of life, impervious to change. Some companies - perhaps with eyes open to the
true material basis of production in their plants - are already attempting to build
systems of workplace participation, espediilly schemes involving workers in fault-
finding and redesign of jobs.
But such objective conditions may also seive to promote an intervention by the labour
movement into the organization of production In other countries trade unions have
won effective control over precisely such processes, greatly expanding worker control
in production. Perhaps the conditions described in this paper could serve as the basis
for unions to colonise the internal labour markets of firms, and gain control over
crucial elements of the labour process. In so doing, they might place themselves in a
powerful position to influence the development of the industry, while at the same
time providing their members with substantial rewards.
PART I. SKILLS, CONTROL, AND CAREERS AT WORK
Issues of skill and control are closely linked concerns in any labour process. Workers'
possession of skill, their knowledge of the job, confers on them some measure of
control over production. This control obviously becomes a problem under systems of
private ownership in which the workers are not themselves the owners of the means
of production. How can a private employer ensure that his goals will be met in the
time, and at the quality, and cost desired?
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Frederick Winslow Taylor understood that workers' possession of skills stood behind
the process known as soldiering, workers' conscious efforts to restrict output to protect
their earnings and conditions of work.2 It was in workers' self-interest for owners to
remain ignorant of how fast work could actually be done, to preserve their own
estimate of the value of their work. Taylor's famous management principles aimed to
overcome soldiering by systematically gathering the knowledge of workers, separating
conception from execution of work by transferring "brain work" from workers to
management, and by formulating precise instructions for each worker which define
the tasks to be done, the procedures to be followed, and the time allowed. These
principles were meant not simply to routinise work, but, more importantly, to
transform power relations fundamentally by transferring skills - and therefore the
control over production - from workers to management.
Taylor's innovations coincided with the experiments by American automobile
producers at the turn of the century which wpuld have even more dramatic affects on
workers' skills and control over production. These experiments transformed an in-
dustry based on specialised production by artisans of small batches of expensive units
into the quintessential mass production industry. Henry Ford's manufacturing
breakthrough was the culmination of advances from a range of mass-production
industries. He combined innovations in fabrication techniques and materials from the
metal working industry with a simple, well-designed car adaptable to a multitude of
driving conditions and markets.3 But Ford's major breakthrough was to integrate
those advances with experiments in two separate areas of production to form the
continuous production system.
The first was to master advances in new machinery and transport mechanisms to
facilitate the continuous flow of materials in assembly. Ford's engineers developed a
myriad of single-use machines fed by unskilled workers to perform simple, precise,
and rapid operations. These machines were meant to eliminate all hand work from
the machining of parts, thereby removing any imprecision in manufacture, and were
were arranged in the exact sequence of manufacturing operations from the first sub-
assemblies through to the final product. Experiments in transport mechanisms linked
these machines together; gravity slides and conveyors moved the job between each
worker while providing a ready supply of components when and where they were
needed.
Ford combined these innovations in production organisation with Taylor's "scientific
management" techniques for dividing skills and routinizing work.4 The modern as-
sembly line led to rapid deskilling and fragmentation of work, which permitted greatly
increasing efficiency and accuracy of production while vastly reducing the dependence
on skilled labour and workers' ability to resist the intensified pace of work.5
The image of assembly work as fundamentally low skilled activity derives from these
interlinked legacies of Taylor and Ford. Oddly enough, their descriptions parallel the
Marxist tradition which emphasises the increasing deskilling and growing alienation of
workers as an inevitable consequence of the growth of capitalism.6 Managers are
portrayed as omnipotent, and their best-case plans are taken as reality, while workers'
own roles are ignored, particularly their resistance to managerial initiatives.
Jean Leger's recent thesis on South African mining contains a lengthy examination of
another approach to workers' skills. In elaborating the concept of tacit skills, Leger
argues that the labour process is always a dual process of conflict and cooperation, in
which management never gains absolute control over production.7 In Leger's
discussion skill is not seen narrowly as the product of some educational or training
programme. Rather, all human activity entails the exercise of some skill. He
identifies two important aspects of "tacit skills." First, what are often assumed to be
routine tasks may involve conscious and unconscious processes which are learned
experientially; they cannot be articulated in formal statements, nor learned through
detailed instructions. Such an approach may help to define the skills present in a
familiar task like riding a bicycle, or the more specialised tasks associated with "the
tricks of the trade." Second, social skills must also be taken seriously as essential
components of any labour process: cooperation, trustworthiness, congeniality, and
obedience.
These skills are described as "tacit" for tide simple reason that they are not formally
recognised nor are they rewarded. Powerful groups may have interests in denying
their existence, while those in possession of such skills may be powerless to articulate
their interests. Rather than seeing skills as some objective datum, Leger prefers to
view them as social constructs. The social construction of skill results from social
processes which involve power relations between individuals and groups in which
certain occupations are defined as skilled or unskilled.8
This approach does not hold that all skills are equal, rather that the common
tripartite distinction between skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled "grossly underrate^]
the working knowledge required and the skills exercised in these occupations....there
is no such thing as unskilled work and...the term is humiliating to the workers so
labelled."9 Craftsmen learn their skills through apprenticeship programs, and through
on-the-job experience where they master the art of applying abstract principles to
specific problems. Their skills are general, and may be applied in diverse situations.
Their skills are formally recognised and accredited. They carry their skills with them.
Tacit skills, however, usually take the fora of "plant specific" skills, in which workers
acquire a store of very detailed knowledge of the particular processes in their factory
or industry. These skills are seldom developed in formal training programs, but can
only be learned on the job through watcliing other workers or through informal
education conducted by factory elders. Ifhe fact that workers are taught "by doing,"
rather than in formal training is not an index of the lack of skills associated with the
work, or of the value of the skills to overall production, but of the particular kinds of
skills.
Such skills may be especially well-developed in older factories where machines
"develop quirks that only their operators can anticipate and control."10 They may
not be recognised in any formal sense, but they are essential to the smooth operation
of the plant; they therefore also possess power to disrupt production. At the same
time, workers with plant-specific skills are extremely vulnerable to plant closure or
relocation: they cannot transfer their accumulated experience into a certificate which
allows them to compete for another job. They may come to share with management
a commitment to maintaining the long-term viability of their enterprise. Leger's
approach indicates the importance of seeing the labour process as an affair in which
workers are more than pawns in management's schemes. If workers are active
participants in production, their positions are in part the result of their own actions
and designs.
The American sociologist Charles Sabel has produced a concept which helps to
capture workers' own involvement in production, The "career" refers to the series of
tasks a person chooses "that successively challenge and require the development of
whatever powers one takes as the measure of human worth." Different work groups
have different ideas of success; "they differ about which powers define dignity, which
jobs count as disgraces and which as accomplishments... Sabel asserts that the
worker's world can be understood as a whole, in which a range of experiences and
ambitions "combine according to stylistic canons that the worker recognizes as his
own." Insofar as these canons shape a worker's responses to events, his behavior
cannot be understood without taking them into account
Taken together, the two concepts of tacit skills and careers at work will help to
provide a different understanding of the labour process in assembly line work in
South Africa, and simultaneously, to grasp the deep frustration workers encounter
when their skills go unrecognized and unrewarded and their career aspirations
unfulfilled.
PART II. THE FORDIST FALLACY AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY
The South African industry dates from 1924, when Ford opened an assembly plant in
Port Elizabeth. General Motors followed its American competitor to Port Elizabeth
in 1926, and the two companies dominated the industry until the post-war period
when European competitors entered the South African market12 In the 1960s
Japanese companies opened plants, and in a decade began to dominate the market.
But the decisive transformation in the industry occurred in the early 1960s, when the
government passed import-substitution legislation forcing multinationals to source an
increasing percentage of their components within South Africa. Previously the
industry had been organised on an assembly basis only, relying on parts imported
from overseas in a disassembled form.13
The program quickly led to the expansion of the industry, as a number of new foreign
producers rushed to establish assembly plants. Assemblers could easily mett the first
stage of local content through inclusion of components already produced in South
Africa. Subsequent stages, however, would be impossible to meet without further
investment in manufacturing operations by the assembly firms and components
suppliers.14
The 1960s expansion had a dramatic impact on employment. Overall employment
grew by 437%, increasing from 8,918 in 1961 to 39,011 in 1975, an annual rate of just
over 29%. As significant as the overall increase, however, was the change in the
racial composition. Where whites accounted for just over half the workforce in 1961
(52.1%), coloureds 27.6%, and Africans 203%, the figures virtually reversed fifteen
years later, with Africans amounting to 44%, whites 34%, and coloureds 22%.u
Not only had the automobile industry developed a majority black workforce, but
blacks were increasingly clustered in the main semi-skilled occupations at the heart of
the assembly and manufacturing operations. The changing size of the workforce,
racial composition, and the advance of blacks to higher still levels should not obscure
an important qualitative change in the character of employment. These workers were
no longer employed solely in assembly work, but in a wide range of occupations
within the new manufacturing facilities, in each plant. Whole new workforces were
needed at those firms opening up engine plants and press shops, with skills never
before required in the assembly industry: skilled workers such as tool and die makers,
machinists, and electricians; semi-skilled die setters, sheet metal workers, motor
mechanics; a whole range of semi-skilled operators of lathes, drill presses, grinding
machines, and presses; and new categories of quality control technicians to monitor
the manufacturing output.
The government's reluctance to intervene to limit the market meant that growth was
characterized by extreme fragmentation. Virtually every MNC automobile producer
entered, and soon South Africa reproduced in miniature the competitive dynamics of
the international market.16 Car compsinies competed through the demand-side
practices of product differentiation used in the European and American markets,
resulting in the proliferation of models and variants, fragmenting still further the
already competitive market The latest models were provided, promising frequent
turnover and high retooling costs, and the motor firms were routinely the most
prolific advertisers among South African corporations.
What possibilities as may have existed for internal economies of scale were lost, and
the companies resorted to battles for the relatively well-off, upper segment of the
market, which meant white consumers,, corporate fleet purchasers, and the
government. These conditions had a dramatic impact on the labor process, placing a
premium on appearance - which rendered the system sensitive to sabotage and other
forms of resistance - and the multiplication of models created high job content for
workers required to assemble a number of different models and variants on the same
line.
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The transition to manufacturing bad a dramatic on the nature of the labour process in
the industry. Yet, the available accounts have often misunderstood the character of
work in the automobile plants, as the studies have been based on a logical fallacy,
that firms could be treated as a black box in which the internal labour processes
could simply be deduced from the conditions of mass production w the home
country.17 This is particularly true in the structuralist Marxist tradition of analysis of
South African industrialisatioa In this approach, the motor plants have been singled
out as pioneers in the transition from manufacture to machinofacture in South Africa,
the latter being a profound change in relations of production in which handicraft
processes are replaced by machines tended by semi-skilled operatives, marking the
"real subsumption" of labor to capital.
Rob Davies has applied such a perspective in explaining the origins of the "civilised
labour policy" of die Pact Government General Motors, according to Davies, was
"perhaps the most mechanised single plant in South Africa during the Fact period,"
and it was in the company's interest to employ relatively well-paid whites, because
they had internalised appropriate capitalist virtues which suited them to such
mechanised work."18 Leaving aside theoretical criticisms of the concepts
machinofacture and subsumption, the depiction of the labor process and workforce at
both GM and Ford is entirely inaccurate for the years 1924 to World War Two. The
first automated assembly lines were installed only in 1948, and it is impassible to
accept Davies' claims about macMnofacture prior to that date. To compound the
problem, the period when more recognizably Tordisf techniques were adopted -
from the 195% onward - coincides with the erosion, rather than the strengthening of
the white monopoly on employment
Yet, even more sober and empirically attentive analysts fall victim to the deductive
fallacy. Roger SouthalTs otherwise excellent assessment of the rise of unions in the
automobile industry nonetheless attempts to read off the South African labour
process from Robert Blauner's analysis of alienation and the assembly line in the
United States.19 Similarly, the work of researchers at the University ©f Port
Elizabeth, under the direction of the industrial psychologist Roux van dsr Merwe,
evaluated the skill levels of jobs in nine manufacturing sectors in Port Elizabeth,
including the motor industry. They too, appear to take the division of labour at face
value in their assessment ©f workers' jobs, and conclude that median job complexity
for auto workers was below the average for all the sectors analysed in the survey.20
The same study was uncritically drawn upon in an otherwise superb study by Jan
Roux who concludes that auto workers have low skill levels, and have been "stripped
of any form of control, both over the ordering of tasks, aad over the speed at which
they had to be executed."21
The shortcoming of each of these presentations is that in decontextualisimg their
studies of the labour process, they ignore a crucial feature of the South African
industry: it's low volume character. It is rather surprising that such an obvious feature
of the industry is not taken into account Most of the same authors readily admit the
effect low volumes have on profitability: producers are forced to spread their
investments over a limited output; economies of scale are impossible, unit costs are
high, and producers are thereby forced into raising prices in a highly competitive
market. High prices further restrict demand, and so the vicious cycle begins again.
However it is posited here that these same conditions have a decisive impact on the
labour process, which fundamentally differentiates South African production from the
processes in metropolitan countries.22 First, the level of output from any South
African plant is but a fraction of the output from a plant in the industrialised
countries. In addition, South African producers, oriented as they are to the white
market and with no jiope of economies of scale, do not compete by cutting prices, but
by differentiating their product througli a range of makes and models, offering a wide
array of options.
Workers on the line therefore operate in a very different environment to workers in
the United States, Europe, or Japan. An assembly line in such plants may be
producing as many vehicles in an hour as a South African line produces in a day;
workers on the line have fair less time to perform their tasks, and are of necessity
given fewer tasks to perform. According to a retired Ford (South Africa) Production
Director,
In a North American line you'd probably get 60 [vehicles] an hour, he's
probably loaded to about .9 of a minute, he only gets time to put on the
front door handle and the rear door handle. Where here a chap is in a
plant producing a vehicle every two minutes. So his work load changes
quite significantly.
Hie South African worker say be responsible for a number of operations which in
America would be performed by a number of workers.
The proliferation of makes and model's complicates the picture. An American plant
might be responsible for producing a single make of car, and workers on line would
face the same model - with the same operations required - over and over again
throughout the day. On a South African line, a worker may encounter a number of
different makes, each with an assortment of models (different engine sizes, two door,
four door, etc.). The condition means that the South African worker must be able to
identity the part appropriate to a particular car. Accordiag t© the Ford Director,
See, basically what determines work content is the number of parts you
handle. If you take a line in the US plants...you probably find that the
bask vehicle has got something in the neighborhood of about 5,000 line
items. There might be a couple: of thousand or so of options. So the
labour is handling possibly between 6,000 and 7,000 line items. A line
item count in a plant like Volkswagen or Ford Motor Company here or
Toyota will be 17,000 to 18,000....So you've got fewer number of
operators assembling those to the product, it stands to reason they are
going to have to know more about the product than people at a higher
rate of production.
In sharp contrast to the repetitive monotony of overseas assembly lines, in South
Africa the greater job content means workers are performing a variety of tasks in a
constantly changing order:
We were building 150 units a day with a mixture....The repetitiveness of
work was alarmingly low. As a matter of fact, in many instances
operators were only repeating the exact same cycle eight times a day,
although they were operating on ISO units a day. Whereas in the states
it could be 60 times an hour.
Workers must master the operations necessary to fit the appropriate part in the
proper manner within the time allotted, or else he will find himself "drifting out of
station," or moving down and interfering with the worker below him on the line. For
this to be done successfully, the worker must learn a variety of tacit skills, usually
from more experienced colleagues on the line:
Q: Did you get any help from the other workers?
A: Yes.
Q: What did they do?
A: Sometimes they helped me. Sometimes they showed me the "how to,"
the art of doing it.
Q: The art." What do you mean?
A: You see, say you fit a tail light, and you are working in a line that is
moving. Someone will tell you, "This thing has got four screws. Put the
light in and fit the washers, the bolts."
Later the same worker expanded on how he learned the procedures:
Or maybe, if you do something like as I have been fitting in there, this
window winder, you may fiddle in putting it in, not knowing the exact
way....Say that the thing is laid this way, you are checking it another
way, and sort of holding it on the side, so someone will tell you, "No,
put it this way and in." I mean, the art.
But fitting parts to a body on a moving line presents its own difficulties, which the
worker must learn to master. Here a worker describes the process of "working up the
line," whereby he places the part in a number of vehicles at once, and then fits each
one, working back to his starting point:
Someone will tell you, "Before you do that, take six lights [walk up the
line] and put in the different cars and come back with them." You see,
the art, the way of doing it is easier for you. More than taking it from
[the bin] and putting it in the car. The car is here at that time. Now
you left it therc.you have to come back [to the bin] again and take a
light, and the car is going forward, see. Now by that time you are
drifting out of station.
Furthermore, a South African plant will integrate a far wider range of production
activities than first world plants. Organizationally, an assembly plant in the United
States or Europe will only assembly cars, and will be fed from a separate engine plant
and a separate body plant, which may even be located in different regions and in
separate divisions of the corporation. In South Africa low volumes mean there are
not sufficient economies of scale to wairramt the establishment of separate plants.
Most companies conduct all or most of these operations under one root so that the
workforce will contain an extremely wide range of occupations.
Most workers in assembly and bask metalworJring operations learned the work from
other workers. Rising up the graded Job hierarchy, workers in intermediate
occupations requiring formal certification, such as metal finishing, acquired their skills
in the Volkswagen training centre, or in private study which enabled them to pass
national trade tests.23 Still higher up the hierarchy, Volkswagen trains a wide array
of artisans through formal &ppr®ntie@§Mps, and a die-setter, two electricians, and a
toolmaker were among those interviewed who had acquired their skills through such
in-house programs.
Workers lower down in the hierarchy were often indeed performing "simple" tasks,
such as fitting components on the assembly line or spot welding in the Body Shop.
Nonetheless, many had acquired multiple skills to the point where they claimed the
ability to perform all the jobs on their line or in their department Many had
developed such skills through their own initiative, by watching other workers. Some
had done so by being temporarily reassigned by the foreman to another job when a
worker was absent One worker eiplained the source of Ms "training" as follows:
I learned these other jobs only by helping other people. Monday, then
the man who is doing the job is not here, and then they take somebody
from our line and then I must learn how to do Ms job....The other jobs
there, nobody ever taught me tow to do them, no91 have just learned
them by seeing.
And on the same lines, another worker said:'
Fm only responsible for fitment. Door fitment, bonnet fitment, fender
fitment, and tailgate fitment That's what Fm doing here. I'm fitting
the bonnets. If for kstaace, the guy wbo is fitting the fenders, he's not
at work, I have to do that, as well.
One operator in the Press Shop (at the bottom of the pay grades), reports that he can
do the work of the die-setter (at the top of the grades):
A: If the setter is not there, I bundle it,! can control the department,
because the foreman is coming to ask us, "Do you know this part?" I
say, "Yes." "How do < you do this; part?" I says "AM right I show you how
to set this machine for that part How to make it right"
Q: How did you leana
A: Since I have a long time doing that job, no one has ever learned me
how to do it, but I only see, on this job now, they did like tin's, they did
like this.
Q: Did that foreman that you described, did he show you those things?
A: No, he didn't show me. He only worked in front of me. I am just
keeping an eye when they are working.
These ailrounder skills possessed by line operators provide management with an
extremely valuable asset: workers can be rotated to different posts as the volume of
work or absenteeism demands. There is no expensive retraining required, and no
interference from cumbersome work-roles, as stipulated in union contracts in the
United States or Britain. Such manpower flexibility certainly enables management to
cut costs, by relieving it of the need to retain temporary workers or a larger-than-
necessary staff.
From the workers' point of view however, such ailrounder status does not prove to be
such an asset. While it is possible to achieve a formal allrounder status, known as
utility man, and to jump a pay grade as a result, many workers claimed to possess
these skills without being recognized. Not only don't they receive a full grade
increase as a result of their skills, but in fact they are frustrated that they often
perform the work of higher graded workers, without receiving even a temporary
increase. One worker commented as follows:
Well, Fm easy to go there, but some other, they have a question. "Why
must I go and do that job? That is Grade 5 and I'm Grade 2, and I'm
not supposed to be there. I'm supposed to help the same grade as I."
Another worker stressed the same theme:
They promise such things. Once they say, "If there are more than about
five jobs in the same line, they will give you something. But they ask
how many jobs you know, you know seven jobs, eight jobs, then you get
nothing. Now the only thing they ask, as far as I am concerned, is when
there is anybody who is absent, they just check on that note that
somebody can do that job,and they take you and put you there. You do
different type of jobs during the week, although you get nothing for
that
Despite developing multiple skills, and in some cases, certificated skills, workers were
divided on the marketability of their abilities. Those who had obtained nationally
recognised qualifications felt secure in their ability to find work elsewhere, and felt
they had learned skills at Volkswagen which would be of use to them in the future.
At the other extremes, some workers who had not obtained formal or informal
ailrounder status felt they had attained very little. A Press Shop operator
complained, "No, no, no, no, you just take your small child and come and operate
this." Another, who installed the electrical harnesses in the vehicles, complained that
he did not know other operations in the car, and described his job as "an empty
bucket, it's not enough information." Yet others, especially allrounders in the
assembly lines, and especially metal finishers and painters felt that their skills could
provide them with a livelihood in the township, repairing cars. Whether or not
management formally recognises such workers as possessing skills, a majority of those
interviewed felt they had acquired abilities which would be of use to them in the
future.
PART III: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Prior to the 1970s, foremen possessed vast discretionary powers, including the power
to grant incremental wage Increases for workers.24 But the foreman's disciplinary
arsenal did not end with wage setting. He also enjoyed the ultimate discretionary
authority: the power to hire and ire. The contractual basis for hourly-rated
production workers was the so-called "hourly basis," which meant simply that they
could be fired on an hour's notice. There were no formal procedures for appeal.
One retired General Foreman from Ford described the dismissal process in the
following way:
A: A fellow will come to you ixi the morning and FI1 say, "Well, George,
where were you yesterday? Where were you the day before?"....Now
just about two or three days after that, he's out of work again. Well he
says, "My wife is not well. She's just had a babyn....There's a weak link.
That fellow, you've got to get rid of. Get rid of him straight away,
because he's upsetting these fellows around this area. You see, when
you're working with a team of ])eople, and you've got one bad egg,
there's encouragement somewhere....So you've got to tie that down.
And the only way to tie that down is to get rid of Mm.
Q: And the decision making would be entirely up to the foreman?
A: Up to the foreman, yes.
Q: And if he had a dispute, would there be anywhere for him to go?
A: No, no, no, you just give it to him. You know, you just get your
General Foreman, you superintendent, and you tell him, "Okay, I fired
this fellow and this is the reason why." And then I'll just take in
another man.
Ollie Rademeyer, former Industrial Relations Director for Volkswagen reinforced the
story by relating an anecdote from General Motors:
You've probably heard it. The biggest optimist in the work force is the
guy who brought his sandwiches to work, because he had no assurance
that he'd still be there at lunch time.
A Volkswagen worker relates the same view from the receiving ead:
Ag! We sort of were ill-treated by the white people here. Just like if,
say, you are a foreman in my department, if you don't like me, you have
to just chase me very, very easily away, drive me away, out of the
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factory....The guy who was responsible for that section used to say,
"Well, I don't like this man. He must go." And then he go, whether he
likes it or not.
These most blatant supervisorial abuses began to be curtailed in the 1960s, when a
union began organising white workers. At first the firms replied as they always had,
with an iron fist They had successfully resisted "interference" from unionising drives
for over 30 years "with typical American methods," according to W.G. Ballinger, one
of many who had attempted organise workers. "In effect, he wrote, "this means that
attempts to organise the workers breaks on the rocks of victimisation."25
In the 1960s, however, white workers used political channels and made a successful
appeal to the government for protection. The Minister of Labour launched an
Industrial Tribunal investigation of the industry for "unfair labour competition"
between whites and blacks, which resulted in Job Reservation Determination No. 16
of 1964. In essence, all jobs then occupied by whites were permanently reserved for
whites; in addition, a number of restrictions were placed on the sorts of jobs blacks
could occupy. For example, no black person could be employed welding jobs outside
of a jig. The Determination would have been disastrous for the companies - if it
were enforced - but the government offered exemptions from the regulation. As
Rademeyer relates:
So we then entered the period of the glorious exemptions. I've never in
my life seen such a farce as that thing....Many jobs that could have been
perfonned...by whites because they were out of jigs, we put into jigs. I
mean, a jig is a jig. You can take a job that really can be easily
performed outside of a jig and just build an angle-iron frame around it
and say, "that is a jig. It can now be performed by a non-white".o..if
there was a difficult job where they couldn't get whites and they had
non-whites, they'd just put a jig around it...Then [the government
inspectors] would say, 'Tes, but it wasn't done in a jig before." We'd
say, "Ja, but you see this model, the 1962, is more technical."
But the determination achieved its aim: to restrict the companies' ability to
introduction black workers into the factory. In essence, no black could be employed
if there were whites available to perform the work. Rademeyer is quite explicit about
the bind the companies were in:
The companies played the game to a certain extent in that any genuine
white worker who presented himself at your gate and he hadn't been to
prison for six or seven months in the last two years, you said, "Okay,
give him a try. He's white." Any bloke they referred to you, "Give him
a try." So that you didn't actively kick whites out.
Job Reservation would have a long-term impact on the company. More than ten
years after implementation of the policy, an audit of the application of the "Sullivan
Principles" at Ford discovered that 45% of white workers interviewed did not have
Standard 8, though all were employed in the highest wage grades; none had entered
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the company below the middle grades. For blade workers, on the other hand, a
Standard 8 certificate was a necessary qualification for advancement to the higher
grades, and very few were employed there.26 Indeed, more than twenty years after
implementation of the determination, black workers were still complaining about the
incompetence and lack of qualifications of white workers and supervisors who were
nonetheless senior to them.
In essence the companies exchanged recognition of the white union for exemptions on
job reservation, and m 1969 an Industrial Council was established for the industry. A
union for coloured workers began organising in 1967, and was admitted to the IC in
1971, and it soon began organising among African workers in the Eastern Cape
plants.
The development of unions is paralleled by the growth in the industrial relations
bureaucracy at each of the companies. Formerly personnel and human resources
departments had been extremely minor divisions of each firm, handling pensions,
benefits, and the security guards, but from the late 1960s they became rapidly
developing power centres. The staff e;cpanded along with the general growth in
employment, but also to keep pace with new functions, especially those related to
regulating labour relations on the shop floor. Functions which were once the
preserve of foremen were transferred to the new bureaucracy, and subjected to formal
rules and procedures. The former Industrial Relations Manager at Ford commented:
We've taken it away from the [foreman] for the sake of good labour
relationships. I mean for no other damn reason....To ensure that if you
get two people breaking the same rule,that the punishment is going to
be the same, given the same circumstances.
The former Production Director at Foird echoed the same view:
I'm fully of the opinion that a lot of the need for a union was as a result
of foreman malpractlce....It was just a case of saying to the foreman:
"Look, you follow this set of rules so that anything that you do with your
labour is consistent with what other foremen are doing."
Hiring and firing was now formally performed by Labour Relations, while wage rates
were the subject of negotiations between employers and unions in the Industrial
Council. Discipline, though meted out by line supervision, was increasingly subjected
to review and appeal through company-union grievance procedures, conducted
between shop stewards, labour relations officers, and foremen. In short, the formal
discretionary power of foremen was substantially reduced by the development of the
internal and Industrial Council industrial relations system.
One foreman in the Volkswagen Body Shop, a particularly tough, big, barrel-chested
man, recalled the time when supervisors wielded such power:
Those were nice days! When we had control of the [pay] increments,
we had control over the worker.;. You can kill his wife or his children,
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but don't take his money away. Now there's no incentive for workers to
work harder.
In the late '60s, early 70s, if you don't like a guy's face you could fire
him....Now you've got to get your facts straight
The former Industrial Relations Manager at Ford substantiated the view:
[The foreman] could no longer give an employee a kicker. He's got to
check with somebody else before he could tucker an employee. Do you
know what a kicker is? A kick in the ass!
Indeed, the institution of a regularised, rule-bound industrial relations system is one
of the factors most often quoted by workers at Volkswagen in accounting for what
they most like about the company. They are protected in a variety of ways by the
union, particularly from unfair dismissal and victimisation by supervision. One
Volkswagen worker eloquently summed up the change:
We used to say, "If the master say or do that, you used to go and run to
do that without questioning why." But now we've got why now. They
don't like that why...! mean, because we used to go and do whatsoever.
If he said, "Go there and do that and whatsoever," now we haven't got
the right, before '80 to ask him, "Why?" He must explain why he send
me there, because Fm working here.
Mailer's recent research on Volkswagen uncovered the same response. When asked
why they joined the union, over 80% of black workers cited the need to defend
workers' rights, including protections against arbitrary discipline or dismissal.27
PART IV. INFORMAL AUTHORITY: THE FOREMAN'S REVENGE?
Despite the development of formal systems for regulating work noted above, foremen
nonetheless continue to possess extremely important power over the most basic
factory processes, especially promotion. It is asserted by virtually all the interviewees
that foremen continue to posses power over wage increments made in the time
between across-the-board increases mandated by the Industrial Council. Workers,
especially those in higher grades, claim these increments account for a none-too-
frequent difference of fifty cents or one rand in hourly pay rates between white and
black workers performing the same tasks. In addition, foremen seem to retain
considerable power over the distribution of overtime work, which interviewees claim
is parcelled out on a racial basis. During periods of short time such unequal
treatment can have a very immediate effect on workers' pay packets.
Within the official system, job grading and promotion are subject to the strict controls
of the labour relations system. According to the formal system, job vacancies are to
be filled by the Personnel Department after notification of any vacancies by
supervision. The Personnel Department advertises posts on in-company bulletin
15
boards, conducts examinations of applicants, and selects appropriate candidates based
on the results of the examination.
In practice, however, the system almost never worked in the formally described
manner. Instead, virtually all workers interviewed described an informal system in
which foremen still wield ultimate control over who gets promoted. When asked to
describe the procedures relating to promotion, only one worker said that the actual
system in fact corresponds to the formal rules. Those who responded to the question
(18 workers) claimed the real promotion procedure operated through favoritism on
the part of foremen, racism, or identified a complete mismatch between education
and promotion. Many expressed indignation at the promotion of less qualified whites
ahead of higher qualified blacks.
Well, say, for instance, there's a. job open for an Assistant Foreman.
What they will do, if there is a white guy they know that would also be
in a position for that job, and myself also make application for that job,
they prefer that white guy to go into that job before they consider me.
And, in a lot of things, you will find that they will mostly push the white
guy to go into certain jobs befoire they push any black guys into that job.
Another worker commented:
How do you like...being taken to be an operator in the lines here, while
the very supervisor, or the superintendent, or even your manager is less
educated than yourself? How would you like that? That's something
wrong, man. That's something wroiag, really.
And another:
We did sit last time with a foreman that can't even make out a time
sheet. He asked somebody from the people working under him to do
his time sheets. I mean that's unfair, in my opinion.
Racism was one frequently stated complaint, but others complained equally bitterly
about favoritism, in which foremen promote workers - African or coloured - who are
tied to them. One worker commented that promotion is not a case of what you
know, but of "Who do you know?" The informal procedure is to approach one's
foreman to ask for promotion. The system seems to be wired in such a way that
foremen can obtain advancement for select individuals. According to the procedures
(and comments by foremen themselves), they should not have such power, but actual
practice is different:
I found out when inside of Volkswagen, when you apply for a job here
you are wasting your time. That is number one...You just couldn't apply
for a job inside. You just have to go to the foreman or supervisor
concerned to tell him that you want that job....You just don't have to
apply for the job inside. If you apply you are wasting your time. You
can apply, and you are being called for an interview. They interview
16
you and they say, "Well call you back." You will never be called back
again.
Q: How do you find out about a job?
A: You have to move around to the people concerned. Tell them you
want the job.-you want to work under Ms belt, you want to work under
him.
Another worker repeated a similar story, but gave more details of the actual hidden
mechanisms of supervisorial control over promotion:
I heard about the job. It wasn't on the board. I heard about it,
somebody told me about the job. So I went up straight to the foremen,
asked him where it was, like that, if there was a vacancy and he told
me, "That you must first bring in your matric, the only requirement is
that you must have some experience of repairman job...
Another worker extended a discussion of these mechanisms, and provided this most
telling story of the way he received a promotion from the lowest pay grade to die-
setting, one of the highest graded and apprenticed jobs:
I applied for die setting. Actually, my general foreman...3ie told me
about the vacancies but the notices wasn't on the board yet. So I had to
see this guy •••••.
The foreman had informed the worker of an extremely important opening, even
before it was relayed to Personnel, and referred him to the foreman in the
department concerned:
I went straight to his office and I told him about this vacancies that will
occur in the Press Shop. And he asked me, who told me about this, and
I said, no, *•*• [his general foreman]. He said, "It's confidential. It's
only between me and him." And he said, "Okay, fill in a form, and
bring your certificate tomorrow."
The worker retrieved his Standard 8 certificate and returned to the foreman:
"Okay, you are in for the thing." So it's about three days after that I
started training die setter, and I've qualified last week.
Through personalistic ties to foreman, this particular worker made a leap over 4 wage
grades into the artisanal "elite." He now receives more than twice his original wage,
and possesses a certificated skill he can take with him anywhere in the country.
Finally, one worker captured the informal - and hidden - character of such processes
with a thoroughly apposite piece of Afrikaans vernacular:
I did make application for a foreman job, and through the time that I
was waiting for the application, somebody told me long before it was
out, "[Another] man is gonna get the job" So what we are calling in
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Afrikaans is smokkel. It's not a man that has got the capabilities and
the man that has got the qualifications that do get a job, it's a man that
has a link with a supervisor or with a manager that do get a job and
that's unfair.
What is the basis of such personal ties?
Many workers claim that race is the fundamental divide, with whites being favoured
above all. But the worker described above is coloured, and African workers have also
benefitted from such relationships on the basis of possessing (or being seen to
possess) appropriate attitudes:
You know, the situation here is politicised, racialised. The relations
between workers and the bosses are also regulated by racial
considerations, political considerations, you know, attitudes that can
affect your progress, if you are deemed or are seen as somebody who
have your own mind Then you suffer in this set-up. You suffer in this
set-up. You must just be moderate. And then you get the right chances
for moving up....If you have definite political inclinations, chances of
advancing are minimal. It fa like that.
One Grade 7 worker with a matric, explained with contempt the approach which
would likely bring success:
So if we go as far as assistant foreman, and if you are lucky enough, and
then you have got to be a friend of the boss, buy him pies and a cool
drink, and let him shout at you like anything, let him say disgusting
things about you, and you don't say anything against him, you just smile
and scratch your head all the time, and then you'll probably be a
foreman.
The general feeling amongst workers was that they could do little to change the
system. Some saw the practice as inherent in the racial system of South Africa, and
nothing short of total political transformation would ever alter it. One man summed
up the situation by saying it made him utterly demotivated. Another protested, "I
don't even bother to apply any more. I just want to quit."
Thus, despite the formal - indeed the (quite substantial - deracialisation of the
workplace and the institution of a representative system of labour relations,
fundamental processes on the shop floor remain part of an informal system of
personal control by white supervisors. While workers may no longer be dismissed or
denied wage increases by despotic supervision, their futures with the company, their
expectations of a career at work, remain subject to their foreman's discretion.
These informal practices seem to violate fairly deeply held values of justice, especially
as related to equality of opportunity. One might have assumed that black workers
would come to expect such treatment ;as a norm, and many were extremely clear in
explaining the informal promotion system as a normal part of South African life: as in
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'that's just the way things are.' But such recognition doesn't seem to have blunted the
sense of morality. "If they can upgrade me," one worker said when asked about his
plans for the future, "if they can send me to the training school, I can go there. Then
if I failed, I won't blame them, FU blame myself." He seemed to suggest that he
could adapt to individual Mure, but could not accept conditions in which he did not
even get the opportunity to test himself. The informal promotion system therefore
corrupts the relationship between, on the one hand, skill, education, and desire, and,
on the other hand, the chances for promotion. The system plays havoc with workers'
expectations and calculations about the future, rendering their "career at work" into
little more than the plaything of their foreman's caprice.
We have to meet that particular foreman of that particular job that you
want to do. Then you speak to him. If he likes you, then he will accept
you. If he doesn't, then it is bad luck.
The absence of clearly defined job ladders, which would at least allow workers some
expectation of a career at work, could possibly have contributed to the view of most
of the workers, who could not envision themselves working at VW in five or ten
years' time.28 Only a small number identified working at Volkswagen as a
possibility. Others expected to be in their own business, unemployed, seeking further
education, or dead! A large number didn't know what they would be doing. One
worker summed up the pessimistic mood: "I don't think I'll be here in 10 years, if god
spares me!"
PART VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INFORMAL AUTHORITY
The pessimism voiced by workers is an unfortunate consequence of the organisation
of control in the labour process in the industry, rather than resignation with factory or
assembly line work perse. As described above, contrary to popular assumptions,
workers in the industry possess an array of skills which are certainly useful to the
company, and to a number of the workers themselves. Given the ability to translate
their tacit skills into a career at work, such skills could also provide workers with a
basis for personal development and self-fulfillment. By not recognizing the
importance of tacit skills, both the automobile companies and the union are
tarnishing an extremely valuable asset through tolerance of a system of informal
despotism.
Labour relations systems in other countries, most notably the German system of co-
determination have institutionalised workers' control over the very processes which in
Volkswagen are controlled by foreman. Manpower training and promotion, in short
the processes central to establishing careers at work, are part and parcel of the legal
system of co-determination, and unions have entrenched rights to participation in
manpower policy-making. As a result, trade unions are able to achieve employment
stability and extensive training for their members. Wolfgang Streeck makes the
argument that such deepening of skills has provided German producers with a highly
qualified work force, and argues that such capacity is an important part of the
foundation for the German producers' extremely successful strategy of building and
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marketing extremely reliable high-quality vehicles.29 In short, Streeck notes a very
close connection between union participation in training and promotion, and
economic success.
Some companies in South Africa, notably Nissan, have seemingly come to a similar
conclusion. They have developed polities adapted from Japan which tap into workers
tacit skills, and while providing higher status for participating, though not yet financial
rewards. Regular communication groups, the so-called "Green Areas" where workers
meet to discuss each day's work, are attempts to marshall workers' tacit skills to
improve production. Volkswagen, too, is experimenting with such policies, and has
promoted "ikayalam" ["my house" in Xhosa] where groups of ten "workers gather in
the foreman's area at the start of each working day and 'specify the work content for
the day and decide who does what and when.'"30 According to Mailer, the initiative
aims "to coordinate common interests on the shop floor by drawing workers into co-
operative, non-union structures in production."
It is not clear, either at Nissan or Vollswagen, whether such structures will offer
workers any substantial rewards, most especially a "career at work." No automobile
company has yet come forward offering guarantees of job security or lifetime
employment characteristic of the German and Swedish co-determination systems or
Japan. It is clear, however, that South African unions have not responded to these
management initiatives, except to reject them. But perhaps these responses are short-
sighted. While many of these programmes - including the one at Volkswagen -
appear to be schemes for avoiding unions and replacing them with company-
controlled structures, the material basis which permits the experiment may also be
claimed by unions. Tacit skills are at ithe core of these participation schemes, and
unions may be able to develop their own schemes to develop such skills. If they can
colonise skill development - perhaps in a variation of the German model - they will
not only be making an effective inroad into central managerial prerogatives, but they
will also be able to provide substantial material rewards to their members.
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questions, to allow scope for comparison of results while allowing respondents room
to expand on their ideas.
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